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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE "TENDER YEARS" DOCTRINE IN VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
In several recent decisions in the domestic relations area, the Virginia
Supreme Court has significantly altered the "tender years" doctrine to
afford fathers more rights in custody of their young children. This aspect
of child custody litigation is actually a corollary of the overall maternal
preference rule in resolving custody disputes between natural parents. Spe-
cifically, the doctrine purports that the mother is the natural custodian of
her children of "tender years,"' and that she should not be denied custody
if she is a fit and proper person. This comment will focus primarily upon
the evolution of this concept in Virginia. These recent judicial modifica-
tions will be compared with national trends and criticisms in this area.
II. HISTORY
The antithesis of the modern tender years doctrine was firmly embedded
in the common law through judicial attempts at resolving child custody
disputes between parents. Contrary to the current maternal preference
rules, the common law awarded custody of minor children to the father as
a steadfast legal right. This principle was deeply ingrained in the legal
reasoning of Virginia courts as evidenced by Latham v. Latham,2 in which
the court awarded custody of a four year old boy to his father. In espousing
the long recognized paramount interest of the father in maintaining cus-
tody of his children, the court reasoned:
The father is the legal guardian of the infant; the law gives it to him against
all the world. The right of the father (say all the cases) to the custody of his
1. The courts have never defined the precise age range which constitutes "tender years."
Generally, the rationale of this doctrine is that very young children require special care and
attention from the mother. Certainly, an unweaned or newborn child would qualify as being
of tender years; however, as the child becomes older, the courts are reluctant to affix a
maximum age limit. In McCray v. McCray, 56 Wash. 2d 73, 350 P.2d 1006 (1960), involving
the custody of a seven year old girl, the court expressly ruled that the tender years doctrine
was inapplicable to school children. However, the Virginia Supreme Court has evoked the
tender years doctrine in custody disputes of children over ten years of age. Moore v. Moore,
212 Va. 153, 183 S.E.2d 172 (1971) (seven and eleven year old girls). See also Annot., 70
A.L.R.3d 262, § 9 (1976).
2. 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307 (1878). See also Carr v. Carr, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 168 (1872).
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legitimate minor children, of whatever age they may be, is perfectly
clear-too well settled to admit of dispute.
3
In applying this legal precept to maternal custody claims, the courts did
not examine the fitness and appropriateness of the mother for custody of
her children, but rather investigated the personal attributes of the father
to discover whether his qualifications were sufficiently harmful to justify
depriving the father of custody.'
This common law cornerstone in Virginia child custody litigation was
explicitly modified by legislative enactment.' The statute clearly abro-
gated the paternal right to custody and supplanted a position of neutrality
in regard to the competing parental claims. By negating the judicial device
of a legal presumption in favor of either parent, the legislature enunciated
the fundamental and essential consideration to be the best interests of the
child in resolving custody disputes.
Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of the statutory language in as-
cribing neutrality between conflicting parental claims, the Virginia Su-
preme Court adopted the tender years doctrine in the landmark case of
Mullen v. Mullen.' The court commenced its legal reasoning by reaffirming
the Virginia criterion in custody matters as being the welfare of the child.
The court proceeded to determine to which parent custody should be
awarded in order to promote the best interests of the child. In addressing
the factors to be considered in evaluating the respective parents, the court
stated:
In considering their qualifications and fitness, we must look to their adapta-
bility to the task of caring for the child; their adaptability to control and
direct it; the age, sex, and health of the child; its temporal and moral wellbe-
ing, as well as the environment and circumstances of its proposed home; and
the influences likely to be exerted upon the child.7
3. Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307, 331 (1878).
4. Specifically, the court dealt with the conflicting parental claims and judicial analysis
in its statement:
The question is not whether the appellant [mother] may be properly entrusted with
the custody of the child, but whether there is anything in the conduct, habits, and
opinions, of the appellee [father] which will justify this court in depriving him of the
custody of the child, and in conferring it upon the mother.
Id. at 337.
5. VA. CoDE ANN. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1973), reading as follows: "IT7he court or judge .
in awarding the custody of the child to either parent. . ., shall give primary consideration
to the welfare of the child, and as between the parents there shall be no presumption of law
in favor of either."
6. 188 Va. 259, 49 S.E.2d 349 (1948).
7. Id. at 270, 49 S.E.2d at 354.
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Despite this theoretical framework of individual assessment, the court
nevertheless concluded by instituting the maternal preference rule when
dealing with children of "tender years."
In Mullen, the parents of a five year old girl were petitioning the court
for custody of the child following a divorce suit instituted by and awarded
to the husband. After affirming the superior consideration to be the welfare
of the child, the court carefully established that either parent was "fit" to
have custbdy. However, in order to facilitate the burdensome process of
determining the best interests of the child, the court formulated a judicial
device encompassing the tender years doctrine. In effect, the court pre-
sumed the interest of a child of tender years would be best served by
awarding custody to the mother, providing she is a fit person and all other
things are equal.'
It is important to note that the majority opinion in Mullen virtually
ignored the explicit statutory language invalidating any legal presumption
in favor of either parent in child custody controversies. In practical appli-
cation, the effect of the doctrine was that of a presumption.
In litigation involving adverse parental custody claims immediately sub-
sequent to Mullen, the courts religiously relied upon the tender years ra-
tionale in awarding custody to the mother The repeated recitation by the
courts of the same language utilized in the Mullen decision indicates its
precedential impact. Exemplifying this adherence to the tender years con-
cept, the supreme court in Brooks v. Brooks'" reversed the lower court and
awarded custody of a three year old boy to his mother. In so ruling, the
8. The original language of the court's reasoning is frequently cited in subsequent Virginia
cases:
It is now generally recognized that the mother is the natural custodian of her child
of tender years, and that if she is a fit and proper person, other things being equal,
she should be given the custody in order that the child may receive the attention, care,
supervision, and kindly advice, which arise from a mother's love and devotion, for
which no substitute has ever been found. Human experience supports the policy that
young children should not be deprived of the care of their mothers and of their love
and tenderness, which may be counted upon most unfailingly.
Id. at 270-71, 49 S.E.2d at 354.
The reader should note that this doctrine is expressly premised upon the notion that only
the mother can perform in the nurturing and loving capacity necessary for early child develop-
ment. This sexual stereotype will be compared with recent psychological developments at a
later point in this article. See notes 42 and 43 infra, and accompanying text.
9. Monahan v. Monahan, 212 Va. 406, 184 S.E.2d 812 (1971); Lundean v. Struminger, 209
Va. 548, 165 S.E.2d 285 (1969); Meyer v. Meyer, 206 Va. 899,147 S.E.2d 148 (1966); Campbell
v. Campbell, 203 Va. 61, 122 S.E.2d 658 (1961); Brooks v. Brooks, 200 Va. 530, 106 S.E.2d
611 (1959); DeMott v. DeMott, 198 Va. 22, 92 S.E.2d 342 (1936).
10. 200 Va. 530, 106 S.E.2d 611 (1959).
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court stated: "Generally, where the child is of tender years and will be
equally well cared for by either the mother or father, the mother, in prefer-
ence to the father, should be awarded its custody."" In other cases follow-
ing Mullen, the court awarded custody to the father of a young child only
after recognizing the tender years doctrine and negating its application by
a finding that the mother was unfit to receive custody."
III. RECENT JUDICIAL MODIFICATIONS
In recent case law, the Virginia Supreme Court has questioned the
weight given to maternal preference in determining decisions with such a
crucial impact upon a child's life. The first indication of the court's waver-
ing from strict adherence to the tender years doctrine was manifested in
Portewig v. Ryder,'3 in which the court affirmed a custody decree in favor
of the father. The court recognized the Virginia precedent but expressed a
somewhat different aspect of its application in the statement: "This rule,
however, is a flexible one and it is not to be applied without regard to the
surrounding circumstances."' 4 The circumstances which negated strict
compliance with the tender years doctrine were the affectionate and stable
ties shown to exist between the children and the father's household, which
had developed over a three year period. Although the mother was not
shown to be unfit, the court was sensitive to the fact that a change in the
children's secure living environment could result in their "emotional mal-
adjustment.""
The subsequent case of Moore v. Moore," involving two daughters, ages
seven and four, appeared strongly to reaffirm and support the traditional
application of the tender years doctrine. In reversing the custody decree
in favor of the mother, the court explained that the principle is justified
by "universal" recognition of the mother as the "natural guardian" of her
11. Id. at 539, 106 S.E.2d at 617-18 (citations omitted).
12. Higgins v. Higgins, 205 Va. 324, 136 S.E.2d 793 (1964); Semmes v. Semmes, 201 Va.
117, 109 S.E.2d 545 (1959). But see Clark v. Clark, 209 Va. 390, 164 S.E.2d 685 (1968) where
the court found the mother was fit, but awarded custody to the father because the presence
of an illegitimate half-brother in the mother's household sufficiently negated the child's best
interests being served in the mother's home.
13. 208 Va. 791, 160 S.E.2d 789 (1968). In this case, the mother was originally awarded
custody of the three children until she was hospitalized for mental illness, at which time the
father assumed custody. After the mother's complete recovery, she reasserted her right to
custody of the children as their "natural custodian." At this time, the children had been
residing in their father's home for three years.
14. Id. at 794, 160 S.E.2d at 792.
15. Id. at 795, 160 S.E.2d at 792.
16. 212 Va. 153, 183 S.E.2d 172 (1971).
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children of tender years. 7 The court referred to the status of this practice
in Virginia as being "settled."' 8 The inference from this case was that the
mother would have to be adjudged "unfit" by clear and convincing evi-
dence to preclude the application of the maternal preference.'"
This view was qualified in White v. White,2" in which the Virginia Su-
preme Court affirmed a custody award to the father of his six year old son
without adjudication that the mother was unfit. The court recited the
familiar language of the tender years doctrine but altered the result of the
case by emphasizing the qualifying phrase, "if other things are equal."',
This phrase had previously been recited superfluously but carried little or
no impact in practical application. Nonetheless, the court attached new
significance to these words by stating that "[i]f the evidence shows that
the mother's home and the father's home are equally suitable for the child,
then 'other things are equal' within the meaning of the rule."22 By failing
to apply the maternal preference in a case involving a child of tender years
with a mother deemed not "unfit" to have custody, the court modified the
usual result by ruling that the mother's home was less suitable for the child
than the father's home." Mr. Justice Carrico, in his dissenting opinion,24
recognized this case as a deviation from the long established Mullen rule.
As an affirmation of this new approach to custody disputes involving
young children, the court utilized the same reasoning process in Burnside
v. Burnside25 to award custody of a seven year old boy to his father. The
court recognized the "strikingly similiar" factual situation to White, where
the mother was not adjudicated unfit to have custody of her young child.
However, rather than applying the tender years presumption, the court
again examined all of the surrounding circumstances and determined that
the child's best interests would be served by awarding custody to the
father. Again, Mr. Justice Carrico dissented" for the same reasons as ex-
pressed in his White dissenting opinion.
17. Id. at 155, 183 S.E.2d at 174.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 156, 183 S.E.2d at 174. See also Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va. 689, 179 S.E.2d 461
(1971), where the court cited the tender years doctrine in the custody award of two children,
ages three and one to the father; however, the court carefully denied its application due to a
finding in the record of the mother's unfitness to have custody.
20. 215 Va. 765, 213 S.E.2d 766 (1975).
21. Id. at 767, 213 S.E.2d at 768.
22. Id.
23. See 62 VA. L. Rav. 1431 (1976).
24. White v. White, 215 Va. 765, 768, 213 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1975) (Carrico, J., dissenting).
25. 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529 (1976).
26. Id. at 694, 222 S.E.2d at 531 (Carrico, J., dissenting).
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The Virginia Supreme Court completed its transition away from the
tender years presumption in Harper v. Harper. 7 In this case, the court
directly confronted the tender years doctrine embedded in Moore and the
application of the statutory language in section 31-15 of the Virginia Code.
Specifically, the lower court had awarded custody of a six year old boy to
his mother, while he was residing with his father. After determining that
both parties were fit and proper persons to have custody, the lower court
evoked the tender years doctrine enunciated in Moore and consequently
held in favor of the mother. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify the inconsistencies in Virginia law:
The Moore 'rule,' referred to by the trial court, is not a rule of law. Indeed,
Code § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1973), which provides that a court, in a child custody
case, shall give primary consideration to the welfare of the child, expressly
states that there shall be no presumption of law in favor of either parent. At
most the principle for which Moore stands is no more than a permissible and
rebuttable inference, that when the mother is fit, and other things are equal,
she, as the natural custodian, should have custody of a child of tender years.2
Moreover, the court held that the evidence did not fail to support a finding
that other things were equal; and therefore, the lower court did not commit
reversible error in awarding custody to the mother.
Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court has reduced the legal significance of
the tender years doctrine from a presumption in application29 to a rebutta-
ble inference, and in doing so has reconciled the diluted tender years doc-
trine with express statutory language.
The next decision in this series of Virginia cases regarding the tender
years doctrine is Clark v. Clark,"0 in which the court affirmed, without
difficulty, the award of custody to the father, utilizing the Harper ration-
ale. The lower court ruling was premised upon the finding that other things
were not equal between the parental homes, because the father's home, in
which the children had resided happily for two years, was more suitable
than the present or proposed home of the mother. Upon ruling that evi-
dence existed to support this finding, the supreme court affirmed the fail-
ure to apply the tender years concept. An important aspect of this case
involved analyzing the suitabilities of the respective parental homes,
which in turn determined whether "other things are equal." From this
conclusion, the court decided whether the tender years concept was applic-
27. 217 Va. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976).
28. Id. at 479, 229 S.E.2d at 877.
29. See cases cited, supra note 9.
30. 217 Va. 924, 234 S.E.2d 266 (1977).
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able, thus permitting a maternal preference. In discussing the factors of
suitability to be considered, the court noted: "But if the mother's home,
evaluated on the basis of warmth and stability, rather than material ad-
vantages, is not as suitable as that of the father, then custody should be
awarded to the father." 31
In McCreery v. McCreery,32 a case just recently decided, the Virginia
Supreme Court unveiled its most elaborate clarification regarding the ap-
plication of and rationale for the tender years doctrine. This case involved
the custody award of two daughters, ages two and four, to the father, after
the chancellor had construed Burnside as overruling Mullen and its pro-
geny to the extent of the existence of a presumption in favor of the mother.
The court easily corrected this mistaken interpretation by making refer-
ence to Harper, decided subsequent to the chancellor's decision, which
demonstrated "[o]n the contrary, Burnside fully acknowledged the
Mullen rule."33 In seeking to clarify the "confusion" surrounding the tender
years doctrine, the court delineated two conflicting societal values underly-
ing custody disputes between natural parents as "the right of a parent to
custody of its minor child and the right of a child to the custodial care of
a parent."34 The court explained that the latter of these rights is superior
because the duty owed by society to one of its dependent members is
greater than the duty owed to a self-sufficient member. Accordingly the
court concluded that the tender years doctrine deals with this right of the
child, irrespective of the parental rights, and infers "that such right is best
served when a child of tender years is awarded the custodial care of its
mother.""
The court basically reiterated its view in previous opinions regarding the
application of the doctrine; specifically, that the tender years "inference"
controls when the mother is fit and other things are equal. However, the
court explicitly defined this term, "other things," in the following passage:
These "other things" are things which affect the quality of the custodial care
received by the child. Quality is determined not only in terms of the training,
talents, and resources of the custodian but also in terms of the motivation of
the custodian to make proper provision for the physical needs of the child,
its psychological and emotional health, its intellectual and cultural growth,
and its moral development. Although fully qualified in other respects, a
person may be too ill-suited by temperament or too preoccupied with per-
31. Id. at 926, 234 S.E.2d at 268.
32. 218 Va. 352, 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977).
33. Id. at 354, 237 S.E.2d at 168.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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sonal pursuits to administer proper care to a child. Comparing the quality
of care offered by two parents, the courts are guided by histories of past
performance and prospects for future performance. If the comparison results
in equipoise, the inference that the right of the child is best served by award-
ing the child the custodial care of the mother controls.-"
In affirming the custody award to Mr. McCreery, the court held that
notwithstanding the erroneous interpretation of Burnside, the chancellor
considered the proper Mullen criteria regarding the respective custodial
quality of the parents. Additionally, the court ruled that the chancellor's
findings of fact were tantamount to holding that other things were not
equal, and thus, the tender years doctrine, though valid, was not applica-
ble to the case.
As the reader can depict from this series of cases, the Virginia Supreme
Court has modified its application of the tender years doctrine from its
origin in Mullen through its dilution in Harper and McCreery. Although
the court paid lip service throughout this entire period to the concept that
the welfare of the child was the paramount and controlling factor in its
custody determination, the Mullen case and its direct descendents"7 clearly
applied the doctrine with the legal weight of a presumption, although not
labelling it as such. In its struggle to reflect modem day social change, the
36. Id. at 355, 237 S.E.2d at 168-69.
The reader should note the reference in this McCreery passage to a child's "moral develop-
ment" in conjunction with a Virginia Supreme Court case decided on the same date, Brown
v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977). In Brown, the mother appealed from a custody
award of her two sons, ages seven and four, to the father, and specifically from the lower
court's finding that she was not a fit person for custody by virtue of an adulterous relation-
ship. The lower court found that Mrs. Brown had maintained a man in her home, together
with her children, on a permanent basis over an extended period of time and that an adulter-
ous relationship existed between them. The supreme court, in affirming the lower court's
decision, stated:
In all custody cases the controlling consideration is always the child's welfare and,
in determining the best interest of the child, the court must decide by considering all
the facts, including what effect a nonmarital relationship by a parent has on the child.
The moral climate in which children are to be raised is an important consideration for
the court in determining custody, and adultery is a reflection of a mother's moral
values. An illicit relationship to which minor children are exposed cannot be condoned.
Such a relationship must necessarily be given the most careful consideration in a
custody proceeding.
Id. at 199, 237 S.E.2d at 91. The court recognized that adultery, alone, is insufficient to render
a parent unfit. In its ruling, the court appeared to emphasize the particularity of the situation
in which: "there was testimony that the relationship between Mrs. Brown and Mr. Leith
[her paramour] had an adverse impact on the parties' two children. Their adulterous rela-
tionship was admitted. They were openly cohabiting in the presence of her two young sons
* . . over an extended period of time." Id. at 200, 237 S.E.2d at 92.
37. See cases cited, supra note 9.
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court has diluted the application of the doctrine to the point where factors
truly indicative of the child's best interest are given priority over the me-
chanical application of the maternal preference. However, the court has
stopped short of total abandonment of the tender years concept, while
achieving a comparable result through the indirect means of re-
emphasizing standard language ("other things being equal"). Upon realis-
tic analysis of factual situations, it appears that the incidents of total
equality existing between the parental homes and their respective suitabil-
ity for the welfare of the child occur rarely. And yet, this is the threshold
finding which triggers the permissible inference of maternal preference."
Thus, considering the improbability that parental qualities will balance,
the courts should utilize infrequently the tender years doctrine as a consid-
eration in child custody resolutions. Nor does the court view the rebuttable
inference status as incompatible with section 31-15 of the Virginia Code.3"
IV. NATIONAL TRENDS
Generally, the majority of courts have recognized and applied the tender
years doctrine in some manner, despite the fact that the vast majority of
statutes mandate the best interests of the child to be the ultimate test in
custody matters." However, there is evidence that support for the auto-
matic operation of this doctrine is declining by means of judicially imposed
limitations rather than by outright rejection." In this respect, the current
status of Virginia law is comparable in that the effect of the tender years
presumption has been diluted in application rather than rejected in theory.
The tender years doctrine has elicited much criticism in recent years due
to the changing concepts of sexual roles in modern society. 2 Basically, the
attacks on this concept have been aimed at the preference for a mechanical
formula which automatically presumes that the best interests of the child
are determined by the parental gender rather than a more objective fact-
38. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262, 269 (1976).
39. See 62 VA. L. REv. 1431 (1976).
40. See, e.g., Weber v. Weber, 256 Ark. 549, 508 S.W.2d 725 (1974); Linderman v. Linder-
man, 19 Ala. App. 662, 275 So. 2d 342 (1973); Mollish v. Mollish, 494 S.W.2d 145 (Tenn. App.
1972); Loveless v. Loveless, 128 Ill. App. 2d 297, 261 N.E.2d 732 (1970); DiBiano v. DiBiano,
105 N.J. Super. 415, 252 A.2d 735 (1969); Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262, §§ 3, 9 (1976). See also
cases cited, supra note 38; Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes,
15 J. FAMmY L. 423 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Roth].
41. See generally, cases cited in Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d § 2, 262 (1976).
42. Roth, supra note 40, at 423; Comment, The Tender Years Presumption: Do the Chil-
dren Bear the Burden? 21 S.D.L. Rwv. 332 (1976); Podell, Peck, and First, Custody-To
Which Parent? 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Custody-To Which
Parent?].
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finding analysis and individual determination. The critical psychological
impact of child custody dispositions has a far-reaching influence on a
person's life. 3 Therefore, considering the significant consequences of an
omnipotent custody decree, a critical examination of the means by which
these decisions are formulated is extremely important.
A. Policy Considerations
The most articulate attacks on the tender years doctrine dispute the
validity of the reasoning behind the doctrine. The policy in granting a
preference to one parent at the expense of the other is unrealistic and
unsound in the context of the reasoning behind the doctrine. As exempli-
fied in the previously discussed Virginia cases," the tender years doctrine
is premised upon the mother's being the "natural" custodian and upon a
reluctance to deprive the child of a mother's "unfailing love." A recent
commentator articulated the erroneousness of this logic, which focuses
upon the importance of the mother rather than the "mothering function,"
which is equally capable of being performed by either parent.45 This notion
is further developed in a recent book,48 which presents the concepts of the
"psychological parent" in relation to basic child development theories.
This "psychological parent" acts in a capacity that is crucial to the nurture
and development of a child. The authors purposely divorce the concept of
the "psychological parent" from the biological parent in terms of analyzing
child-parent relationships."
Another commentator has attacked the policy behind the tender years
doctrine from another angle.
43. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SouIrr, BEYorN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)
[hereinafter cited as GOLDSTm, FREUD, AND SoLNr].
44. See notes 6-12 supra, and accompanying text.
45. A considerable amount of research supports the proposition that what a child
needs during the "tender" years is a certain quality of affectionate relationship with
someone in loco parentis, and this can be provided by the father as well as the mother.
"The word 'mothering' in this context denotes a function, rather than a person; this
function does not necessarily reside in the biological mother."
Roth, supra note 40, at 449, citing P. ALLEN, et. al., READINGS IN LAw AND PSvCmATRY, 319,
320 (1968).
46. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, and SOLNrr, supra note 43.
47. Id. at 19.
Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based thus on day-
to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The role can be fulfilled
either by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any other caring adult-but
never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the
child may be.
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The assumption that the mother is a better custodian was and is wrong
from an historical, economic, sociological, and philosophical point of view.
The notion is unfounded because it fails to project the family unit into the
post-divorce reality where the mother must assume both a mother's and a
father's role. A look at the contemporary role of the mother and the difficul-
ties encountered when she alone runs the family unit supports the current
egalitarian viewpoint. 8
B. Constitutional Challenges
Notwithstanding these refutations of the reasoning behind the tender
years doctrine, there have been recent questions raised as to the constitu-
tionality of the tender years presumption based upon equal protection and
due process analysis.49 The effect of the tender years presumption is to
impose an unfair burden upon the father in custody disputes to prove that
the mother is unfit or that "other things are not equal."" The most explicit
denunciation of the tender years doctrine as unconstitutional sexual dis-
crimination is in Watts v. Watts,5 decided by a lower New York court. By
directly confronting the equal protection issue, the court held that the
tender years doctrine resulted in differential treatment of parents as cus-
todians based on sex. Thus, the analysis proceeded by applying strict
judicial scrutiny to the suspect classification of sex.5" The court held that
48. Custody-To Which Parent?, supra note 42, at 53. Mr. Chief Justice Hudgins also
recognized the same flaw in the tender years theory by examining post-divorce reality in his
dissenting opinion in Mullen. After recognizing that the mother's lack of alimony would
impose financial hardships on the mother and her child, he stated:
Under these circumstances necessity will compel her to seek employment, in which,
event it will be necessary to employ a nurse to look after the six-year-old child. There-
fore, the mother will be in no position to give any more personal care to the child during
business hours than the father.
Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 281, 49 S.E.2d 349, 359 (1948) (Hudgins, C.J.)
49. Roth, supra note 40, at 442-8 (1977); 21 S.D.L. REv. 332, 337-49 (1976).
50. This is the language utilized by the Virginia Supreme Court in Clark v. Clark, 217 Va.
924, 234 S.E.2d 266 (1977); Harper v. Harper, 217 Va. 477, 229 S.E,2d 875 (1976); Burnside
v. Burnside, 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529 (1976); White v. White, 215 Va. 765, 213 S.E.2d 766
(1975).
51. 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fain. Ct. 1973). For an extensive equal protection
analysis concluding that the tender years doctrine is unconstitutional regardless of the differ-
ent standards of judicial review applied see 21 S.D.L. REv. 332, 337-47 (1976).
52. Although a majority of the Supreme Court has not ruled that sex is a suspect classifica-
tion subject to strict scrutiny, there has been much uncertainty regarding the precise stan-
dard of review for gender distinctions in recent Supreme Court case law. Regardless of the
exact standard utilized, the Supreme Court has demonstrated an increased sensitivity to sex
classifications. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). For a complete analysis of each standard of
review see 21 S.D.L. Rev. 332, 337-47 (1976).
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the best interests of the child might well qualify as a compelling state
interest in order to justify the discrimination; however, the tender years
doctrine was not deemed to serve the best interests of the child. 3
Another possible constitutional violation involves due process considera-
tions, in that the right to raise one's children is an interest protected by
the fourteenth amendment. 4 The judicial presumption of the tender years
doctrine deprives a father of this right and arguably contradicts the notion
of due process, which requires a more individualized determination of the
child's best interest. The authority that is most commonly cited by analogy
to invalidate the tender years presumption is the United States Supreme
Court case of Stanley v. Illinois,5" involving a state statute which denied
putative fathers custody of their children upon the death of the mother.
The Supreme Court held that to conclude that unwed fathers were unfit
parents without the benefit of a hearing to determine individual qualifica-
tions was a denial of due process.
V. CONCLUSION
The Virginia Supreme Court has followed the recent trend of a majority
of jurisdictions by limiting the effect of the tender years doctrine. By
diluting the weight of the maternal preference from a presumption in ap-
plication to a "permissible and rebuttable inference," the court has sup-
posedly reconciled the tender years doctrine with the express statutory
language of section 31-15,11 which negates a presumption at law in favor
of either parent. This evolving process has also allowed the courts to make
a more individualized assessment of the opposing parental homes for the
purpose of making the crucial decision of which parent and his or her
respective home would serve the best interest of the child. In reducing the
burden of proof on the father (although not totally eliminating it), the
court's approach is more aligned with modern egalitarian sex roles.
Although the definite trend is to limit the tender years doctrine by
judicial restraints, recent commentaries have provided valid and persu-
asive arguments for its complete abolishment. These arguments are prem-
ised upon either the outdated rationale for the doctrine or the constitu-
tional violation of the equal protection and/or due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. Regardless of whether the presumption is diluted
53. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
54. For an analysis of the conclusive presumption test derived from the due process clause
see 21 S.D.L. REV. 332, 347-49 (1976). For a comparison with the equal protection line of
reasoning see Roth, supra note 40, at 442-48.
55. 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
56. Va. Code Ann. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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out of practical existence or is expressly rejected, the courts will have to
supplant its function with some other device to aid in resolving the com-
plex best interests test. The courts should incorporate into the decision-
making process involving very young children the concept of "mothering"
as a function capable of being performed by either parent. This approach
should facilitate a more equitable and efficient means of custody determi-
nation.
Deborah M. Russell

